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# Ballots and Broadcasts

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The Impact of  
Expectations and  
Election Day Perceptions  
on Voting Behavior

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BALLOTS AND BROADCASTS:  
THE IMPACT OF EXPECTATIONS AND ELECTION DAY  
PERCEPTIONS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR

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## INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of this study was to explore a wide range of responses, including attitudinal responses, to the election broadcasts. Such responses, we felt, could provide insights regarding the operation of possible bandwagon or underdog effects which might not emerge from essentially quantitative data. In pursuit of this objective, intensive interviews were held with members of a sample of 364 registered voters in the East Bay area of California who had not yet voted at 4 p.m. PST, when network broadcasts of election returns went on the air. While the effect of attitudinal reactions on the number of votes and for whom they were cast was clearly minimal, knowledge of how voters decided to vote, or not to vote, or to switch their vote, or of how they were sustained in their previous intentions can, we believe, provide some implications for understanding how voters might react in other elections.

Our sample was chosen to include a variety of voter characteristics that might be relevant to an understanding of the influence of the broadcasts. At no time was it our aim to make precise quantitative projections to a larger population.

For purposes of comparison, a smaller sample of 116 persons was drawn in Ohio, more specifically in the Greater Cleveland area. This sample consisted of registered voters who, like their counterparts in California, had not voted by four o'clock local time. Since the polls in Ohio closed at 6:30 p.m. EST, Ohio residents could not have heard network broadcasts prior to voting. The Ohio sample could therefore serve as a comparison group to alert us to any sort of demographic or behavioral traits which might be characteristic of Late Voters or Non-Voters, quite aside from whether they did or did not hear election returns.



The Ohio group will be discussed at only a few points in this particular paper, which deals in the main with the reactions of the California sample to the broadcasts themselves.

In both states, our respondents were selected by systematic methods from precinct lists of voters who had not yet voted by 4 p.m. local time. The manner in which precinct records are kept in both Ohio and California makes it relatively easy to compile such a list. Our respondents in both states are accordingly restricted to persons who have been verified as registered voters who either voted after 4 p.m. local time or who did not vote at all.

In both California and Ohio, precincts were so drawn as to produce roughly similar proportions of Democratic and Republican registrants and to represent the high, medium, and low-income strata into which the total list of precincts had been divided.

Interviewing began the day after Election Day and was completed within eleven days.



## INFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS

### Exposure to Election News

By 5:30 p.m. PST, an hour and a half after network broadcasts of election returns had begun in California, 144 members of our sample had already cast their ballots. Of these, 40, or 28% of those who had already voted, had been previously tuned in to the election broadcasts (Table I). The proportion exposed to such broadcasts increased as the hours went by. By 8 p.m., when the polls closed, 352 members of our sample had voted, and 138, or 39% of them, had been previously exposed to election broadcasts.

Knowledge of the election returns, however, was not limited to information from network broadcasts. Late Voters had also obtained information from earlier non-network broadcasts, from other persons, and from newspapers. Accordingly, a full 61% of our sample, including both Late Voters and Nonvoters, had some idea of "how the race for President was going" before they voted (Table 2). Only 37% reported that they knew nothing at all about the race before voting.\*

Among the 61% who had heard something of how the race was going, over half (34% of the entire sample) were certain Johnson had won, and an additional ten percent believed that he was ahead, and would probably win. Only two percent of the sample thought Goldwater still had a fighting chance to win.

As we have noted, neither the information nor the perceptions with which these voters went to the polls can be attributed entirely to the network broadcasts that began before the polls closed. Thus, among members of the Ohio sample who voted between 4 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. local time, 14% said that they had heard or

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\* Adequate information on this point could not be obtained from two percent of the respondents.



seen something that gave them some idea of how the race was going before they voted. This information could not possibly have come from network broadcasts, since these were not yet on the air. It is thus reasonable to assume that even without network broadcasts a comparable and probably a greater proportion of California voters (as contrasted with Ohio voters) would have had some idea of how the race was shaping up by the time they went to the polls; election news by then available from more parts of the country obviously would have given California a better general picture of the progress of the election. The Ohio figure provides a rough measure of minimum influence attributable to coverage of Election Day news by means other than network election coverage. Without considering these other sources of information, one cannot talk accurately about the impact of Election Night broadcasts.

Broadcasts -- both network and earlier scattered returns -- were, however, the primary source of perceptions of how the race was going. The broadcast media were cited in this connection by 81% of those having such perceptions (Table 3). The impact of the broadcast media as a source of Election Day perceptions was probably even more widespread, since an additional 16% cited other persons as their primary source of perceptions, and much information obtained from others may originally have come from radio or television.

#### Effect of Information on Perception of Outcome

Respondents who obtained perceptions of the race directly from radio and television were more often certain of the outcome than respondents whose perceptions derived from other sources (Table 3).

When respondents were asked which elements of election broadcasts were most helpful in giving them an idea of how the race was going, 65% mentioned either





the vote count or the tally of electoral votes, and only 16% mentioned computer predictions (Table 4). The overwhelming Johnson margin apparent so early in the day, the number of electoral votes he was apparently collecting and the conclusive returns from populous states in the East were sufficiently unambiguous to dispel most doubts. But computers, though less often cited as a source, had higher effectiveness than the other sources in crystallizing certainty of outcome.

We now turn to the question of what effects, if any, these perceptions had on the voting behavior of our respondents.



## LATE ELECTION DAY SLACK

### Nonvoters

It has been claimed that when an election is in effect "decided" before the polls are closed, the motivation to vote is reduced, and persons who planned to vote presumably do not do so. Such a reaction would produce what we shall call "late Election Day slack".

As part of our investigation of the nonvoting rate, we obtained official records of the number of registered persons who did and did not vote in each of the precincts studied in both California and Ohio. On the basis of these records, the overall rate of nonvoting (Table 5) appeared very slightly higher in Ohio (16%) than in California (14%).

Before commenting further on these nonvoting rates, we would like to discuss our own experiences in regard to locating nonvoters. These experiences produced some unanticipated findings which must be taken into account in the discussion of nonvoting rates.

Our California sample was so drawn that, on the basis of official records of voting and nonvoting, it should have yielded interviews with at least one nonvoter for every three late voters. As the interviewing progressed, however, admitted nonvoters appeared to be almost non-existent in California, accounting for only about three percent of completed interviews. The situation in Ohio was roughly similar.

This lack of nonvoters seemed explicable in one or both of two ways: either (1) our techniques were at fault in that nonvoters were somehow evading our interviewers or falsely stating that they had voted, or (2) the precinct lists



were in some way inaccurate and greatly exaggerated the actual amount of nonvoting.

We accordingly instituted a special procedure for checking on alleged nonvoters in both California and Ohio. In California, precinct sign-in rosters were compared with registration lists to provide an enumeration of persons listed as nonvoters. Selected interviewers were instructed to contact these persons and determine whether they had in fact voted and, in the event of their being unable to contact them, to determine why they were so hard to reach. A roughly similar procedure was followed in Ohio.

It shortly became apparent that a considerable number of the alleged nonvoters were in fact "spurious" nonvoters. As indicated in Table 6, 71% of the nonvoters in California and 59% of those in Ohio had either moved out of the precinct or had died. For people in this group the "nonvoter" label was a mere artifact of their names still appearing on the lists of precincts in which they no longer lived.

Additional numbers of nonvoters were found to have been ill (Table 6), in the hospital or at home, or to have been away from their city of residence on Election Day. For one reason or another, no information could be obtained on 15% (in Ohio, 19%) despite several call-backs.

On the basis of these statistics a correction factor was applied to the official voting records. In order to correct with the utmost conservatism we subtracted from the group of alleged nonvoters only those who were stated by family or neighbors to have died or moved out of the precinct. When so corrected the proportion of nonvoters in California dropped to four percent and the proportion in Ohio to seven percent. It is to be noted that, relative to Ohio, nonvoting in California thus appears even lower than it did before. The four percent



nonvoting rate in California accordingly represents the upper limit within which broadcast-induced abstentions could occur.

We submit that this finding - a finding in an area we were not tooled to investigate - merits further research on a national scale. If large numbers of alleged nonvoters are in fact mere bodiless names on registration lists, then estimates of political interest based on the proportion of registered voters who have not voted are apt to be somewhat misleading. Further inquiries into these topics should of course provide for determining whether the bodiless nonvoters do in fact vote in the precincts to which they have moved.

#### Real Nonvoters

Interviews could be completed with only 12 nonvoters in California and 10 in Ohio. Five of the 12 in California had heard nothing about how the race was going before the polls had closed. Of the remaining seven, four were ill at home or in the hospital. One had long ago decided to vote only on the Propositions. Another said "circumstances" kept him from voting, and everything else he said indicated a lack of interest in politics and the election. The last, a Republican, had intended to vote for Goldwater, but did not do so after he learned from election broadcasts that the race had been decided and his vote would be "useless". This was the one case of clear broadcast-induced abstention from voting which we were able to discover.

Since the 10 nonvoters in Ohio could not have been exposed to network election coverage they will not be discussed in this paper.

The remaining portions of this paper deal almost entirely with the reactions of California voters and nonvoters to the broadcasts themselves. The Ohio sample





will accordingly not be further discussed here. The behavior of that sample will, however, be more fully treated in subsequent reports.

### The Resolution of Doubts

All Late Voters were asked whether before the election they had ever seriously considered not voting at all, whether they had considered voting but not voting for President, or voting but not voting for Senator. Sixty-eight California voters reported they had considered abstaining altogether, or abstaining from voting for one or both of the top offices (Table 7). More had considered not voting for President than had considered not voting for Senator (51 as compared to 30).

These respondents were also asked whether they still had the same doubts on Election Day itself. A considerable number did, and those considering not voting for President still outnumbered those thinking of not voting for Senator. Before the polls closed, however, all 68 had cast ballots: two did abstain from voting for President, and six did not vote for Senator.

In general, then, doubts about voting on the part of the vast majority of this group were resolved. Did broadcasts of returns play any role in the decision of the abstainers? Did they play a role in bringing the others to vote? And did the broadcasts somehow exert a different influence in reference to the Presidential race than in reference to the Senate race?

Our data indicate that neither the broadcasts nor the perceptions they induced were influential in causing the abstentions. Let us quickly examine the situation of all eight partial abstainers.

Both voters who did not vote for President had seriously considered this all along, including on Election Day. Both were anti-Goldwater Republicans; both



voted for Murphy. One was certain before voting that Johnson had won; the other had not seen or heard anything about the race. In neither case did the broadcasts bring about any change. None of the six who sat out the Senate election (but voted for other offices) had heard anything about the Senate race before the polls closed. All six reported that during the campaign they had seriously considered not voting, and two stated that they had definitely decided, before Election Day, not to vote for Senator.

In short, then, the data from our study provide no evidence that the broadcasting of election returns caused any significant number of persons to abstain from voting altogether, or to abstain from voting in the Presidential and Senate races.

It may also be asked whether the broadcasts had the opposite effect. Were persons who seriously considered abstaining motivated to vote by the broadcasts? We did find that those of our respondents who had at some time considered not voting at all, or not voting for President, were somewhat more likely than others to have had information about the returns before they went to vote, and also somewhat more likely than others to have become certain of the outcome (Table 8). Nevertheless, the accounts these voters gave of their Election Day behavior do not indicate that they had deliberately sought information about the outcome before deciding whether to vote for President. We can only say that there were 36 voters who had considered not voting for President and who had perceptions of the outcome. All but one (35 out of 36) actually voted. The one abstainer from the Presidential race was certain of the outcome, but so were 22 of the 35 who voted.

Only 14 persons in our sample reported making any kind of voting decision on Election Day itself. Of these, eight had heard nothing about the trends before going to the polls. Four others who had heard returns all thought Johnson was



either ahead or the victor; three of these four finally voted for Goldwater and one voted for Johnson. The remaining two who had heard returns about the Presidential race decided to vote for Murphy without having heard anything about the Senate race.

Considering the decisive lead which Johnson held in the returns virtually from the beginning, the 1964 election offered maximal opportunity for Election Day slack. Yet our study found clear-cut broadcast-induced slack only in the case of one single Goldwater supporter, who as a result of what he heard lost all interest in voting. We cannot of course use a single case to estimate the degree of slack throughout the state or its net effect on the outcome of the election. Our findings regarding nonvoting clearly indicate, however, that any such slack as might have occurred was extremely limited.



# THE BELIEF IN BANDWAGON EFFECTS

Politicians, and other people as well, have long assumed that people like to be on the winning side, and that indications of the outcome of an election are thus likely to produce a "bandwagon effect" among persons who have yet to vote.

Our data indicate that this belief is widespread, at least in reference to public opinion polls. More than a third of the sample agreed with the test statement, "Public opinion polls hurt the chances of the candidate they say is behind". Again, when asked in another question whether they thought pre-election polls seemed to have influenced the outcome of the Presidential election, 30% stated they "certainly" had, or "probably" had. When asked to spell out these alleged influences, nearly half of the 30% referred, in one turn of phrase or another, to "bandwagon effects".

Our interviews produced some spontaneous criticism, along the same general lines, of broadcasting returns and, more frequently, of computer projections.

"The returns should not be announced until polls are closed in California".

"I believe that polls throughout the country should open and close at the same time".

"Computer predictions greatly affect voters in the Far West who are undecided".

"I dislike when they predict. I think it can influence people out here".

"People might like to be on the winning side".

Yet, notwithstanding their belief in poll or broadcast induced bandwagon effects, these same persons overwhelmingly rejected what might be called elements of "bandwagon philosophy" (Table 9). Ninety-four percent disagreed with the statement "If I have no clear preference, I like to be for the man who is running





were asked 13 -

ahead". And even more (97%) rejected the notion that "if you vote for a loser you are wasting your vote". Voters who thought that pre-election polls had influenced the 1964 outcome also failed to a man to document the bandwagon effect by references or anecdotes concerning either themselves or anyone they personally knew. Some of them, however, voiced fears that they themselves might be influenced by broadcast returns. "I purposely had not listened before I went to vote", said one respondent, adding "I wanted to think". Another thought the outcome of the vote on the California Propositions was due to Johnson supporters not having bothered to vote.

The belief in bandwagon effects was clearly related to political preferences. Goldwater supporters coupled their expressions of dismay with criticism of the computers, "prophesying robots", as one called them. "It gives you a feeling of defeat", said one. "What's the use anyway?" Belief in the operation of poll-induced bandwagon effects was most widespread among Goldwater voters (51%), registered Republicans (48%), and those who voted for Murphy (47%). Conversely, belief in these effects was least common among Johnson voters (33%), registered Democrats (32%), and those voting for Salinger (32%). The relatively low level of belief in poll-induced bandwagon effects among registered Democrats could be in part a carryover from Truman's unexpected victory in 1948, but seems more likely, along with the widespread concern among Republicans, to be a function of current political developments.



## ATTITUDINAL REACTIONS AND POTENTIAL INFLUENCES OF ELECTION DAY BROADCASTS

This study was not designed to gauge the "net effect" on the election outcome of any bandwagon or underdog effect that may have operated. It aimed, rather, to explore attitudinal reactions to broadcasts of election returns among potential voters who had not yet voted -- reactions which, if carried further, might have led them to decide to vote, not to vote, or to switch their choice of candidates. While the effect of these reactions on the number of votes cast in the 1964 election was clearly minimal, we should consider what they imply for voting behavior in future elections.

Underlying the whole relationship between the broadcasts and the reactions of the voter is the "law of minimal consequences".\* Those vulnerable to being affected by the broadcasts constitute a limited group, a group consisting of the relatively small proportion of all voters who (a) had not already made a firm decision whether to vote or how to vote, and (b) who also had heard the broadcasts. Thus, the group potentially open to influence from the broadcasts is, at the very outset, limited in size, and the size is further diminished by the fact that the returns are themselves perceived within the framework of the individual's expectations concerning the outcome, his preference for a particular outcome, and the importance which he ascribes to his preference. Let us first take up the effect of expectation and preference on perceiving the outcome as already certain.

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\* The term was suggested by Professor Hope Lunin Klapper, and refers to the tendency for the short-run conversion potential of media content to be minimal, being progressively reduced by a series of mediating factors, each of which tends most often to minimize the likelihood of change.



### Expectations Concerning Outcome

Reluctance to draw conclusions from Election Day perceptions can be an expression of wishful thinking by respondents who do not intend to give up hope, or it can reflect a fear of premature rejoicing, a "don't count your eggs" reaction. Such psychological mechanisms may explain why early perception of a sure Johnson victory was not statistically related to choice for President (Table 10). Either these preferences have no discernible effect, or psychological effects working in opposite directions cancel one another out.

Most respondents, however, were not reluctant to draw conclusions. Over three-quarters, 79%, reported that as soon as they turned on the network broadcasts of returns they "knew right away" that the race was pretty well decided. Among those tuning in by 5 o'clock, almost three-quarters, 73%, reached this conclusion "immediately". Among those joining the audience after 7 p.m. the proportion was 86 percent. Asked how they "knew" so quickly, ten percent of those who tuned in when coverage began explained that the outcome "was already decided before it started".

We would expect the impact of Election Day broadcasts to be at its lowest among those expecting a Johnson landslide, since they already believed that he would win. We would also predict that the amount of information needed to confirm an expectation would be less than that required to invalidate it. To discover the effect of expectation on perception (and thus to test our expectations) we compared those who, before Election Day, expected a close race in which Goldwater had a chance, with those expecting a runaway Johnson victory. On the basis of what they saw or heard in the early returns, those who expected a



Johnson landslide were twice as likely to be certain of a Johnson victory before they voted as were those expecting an extremely close race (Table 11). Thus, the potential impact of election broadcasts was further limited by pre-existing expectations about outcome.

#### Perceived Importance of the Election

We would expect that voters who (a) think that who wins makes "a great deal of difference" rather than "little difference" or (b) view this election as being "more important" than most elections would be more likely to reach conclusions about the outcome of the race on the basis of returns. These persons would seem likely to have the background, interest, and knowledge to correctly assess the significance of what they heard. The hypothesis receives some substantiation (Table 12). There seems to be a tendency for those seeing the election as "more important" and "making a great deal of difference" to be more certain of the outcome. Yet those who perceive the outcome as being quite important, as making a great deal of difference, should, by virtue of their belief, be unlikely to be dissuaded from voting by election broadcasts. If this is indeed true, the same factor that promoted a readiness to pay attention to election news, on which the conclusion that Johnson had won would naturally be based, must have lessened the likelihood of a decision not to vote. Thus again, the potential impact of election coverage would be limited, in this case by the perceived importance of the outcome.





### Motivation to Vote

The "law of minimal consequences", like most social science generalizations, is a probability statement. Even though the majority of those exposed did not experience a change of attitudes, some, despite the general pattern, had changed in that they felt either "more" or "less" eager to vote as a result of exposure to election broadcasts. We looked closely at those whose attitudes had changed, seeking factors associated with the changes. Our preliminary investigations show that certainty of the outcome is a factor very highly related to attitude change.\* When the attitude changes are ordered by time (Table 13), one can discern a possible increase in their incidence in the later hours, as the outcome presumably becomes more certain. Although the number of cases is extremely small, one might note the possibility that, relative to "more eager", the "less eager" response is particularly evident in the last hour.

It should be observed, however, that the number "more eager" to vote considerably exceeded those "less eager" to vote (Table 14). The net effect of these attitude changes, then, was toward strengthening tendencies in voting rather than toward abstention. Moreover, all of the "less eager" did in fact vote and, with only one exception, did cast a ballot for President. This single exception reported that he had seriously considered the matter and had decided

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	More/Less Eager	No Attitude Change	
Certain of Outcome	44	79	123
Exposed, but <u>not</u> certain of outcome	14	82	96
All Exposed	58	161	219



before Election Day not to vote for President. Voters who became either "more eager" or "less eager" split their vote between the two Presidential candidates in practically identical proportions.

One can ask why those who felt "less eager" to vote nevertheless all voted. We can offer interpretations on two levels.

First, on the more general level, many voting studies have indicated that the closer Election Day comes, the stronger are the social and psychological pressures impelling those still undecided about voting to exercise their franchise. The pressure also operates on persons with no clear-cut political preference and, we reason from our study, on those who no longer see their vote as having an influence, i.e. on those who believe that Johnson "had already won". It appears that some people will vote simply in order to fulfill the obligation they feel to participate in the political process. For them the fact that their vote cannot affect the outcome is not entirely relevant. In the words of one respondent, "Voting is a God-given right" -- a view echoed by others on less hallowed grounds.

Second, the motivation to vote in any given election is complex and hinges on all the offices and issues contested at any given time, not just on the vote for a single office -- even if that office is the Presidency of the United States. If the motivation to vote is undermined by perceptions that the outcome of one of the races is already a foregone conclusion, interest could well shift to other races which otherwise would not have been considered as important. This hypothesis and data bearing on it will be explored in greater detail in a subsequent paper. Here we wish to point out only that the reaction of registered voters to early returns is not a simple and reflexive response, but rather involves considerable



complexities that cannot be formulated into a single simple generalization. Even though in this election the effect on the balance of votes appeared slight, the broadcasts cannot be said to have produced no effects at all. Many of these effects remain latent insofar as they are offset by other counterbalancing tendencies. The problem of understanding why and under which specific conditions overt consequences do or do not occur is, we believe, as important as documenting their magnitude with a high degree of precision.



## T A B L E S





TABLE 1

PERSONS FOLLOWING NETWORK RETURNS  
BEFORE VOTING BY TIME OF VOTING

Did <u>Not</u> Vote By . . .	Persons Who Followed Returns Before Voting		Total Voting (N=100%)
	N	%	
4:00 p.m. (but voted by 5:30 p.m.)	40	28	144
5:30 p.m. (but voted by 6:30 p.m.)	50	40	126
6:30 p.m. (but voted by 8:00 p.m.)	48	60	80
All Late Voters	138	39	352 <sup>a/</sup>
Nonvoters (who tuned in by 7:30 p.m.)	7	58	12

<sup>a/</sup> Two voters who could not recall the time they voted are omitted from the subtotals.



TABLE 2

ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE BEFORE VOTING<sup>a/</sup>

Perception Of Presidential Race	California		Ohio	
	N	%	N	%
Johnson "had won," certain to win	123	34	9	8
Johnson ahead, would probably win	36	10	4	3
No conclusion, returns not significant	54	15	3	3
Goldwater ahead or doing well	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Sub-total	219	61	16	14
No information about returns	136	37	99	85
No answer	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	364	100	116	100

<sup>a/</sup>For nonvoters, the reference is to perceptions before polls closed.



TABLE 3  
PRE-VOTING ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS BY SOURCE<sup>a/</sup>

Most Important Source Of Election Day Perception	Total Citing Each Source		Perceived Outcome As Certain Before Voting	
	N	%	N	%
Television	87	40	54	62
Radio	90	41	50	56
Persons	35	16	15	43
Newspapers	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>29</u>
All Sources	219	100	121	56

<sup>a/</sup> For nonvoters, the reference is to perceptions before polls closed.



TABLE 4

ELEMENTS IN ELECTION BROADCASTS JUDGED "MOST HELPFUL"  
IN HELPING RESPONDENT DECIDE HOW THE RACE  
FOR PRESIDENT WAS GOING<sup>a/</sup>

Elements In Election Broadcasts	Total Citing Each Element		Perceived Outcome As Certain Before Voting	
	N	%	N	%
Actual vote count	119	33	37	31
Electoral vote tally	117	32	42	36
Computer predictions	59	16	26	44
All others	<u>69</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>26</u>
Total	364	100	123	34

<sup>a/</sup> For nonvoters, the reference is to all perceptions before polls closed.





TABLE 5

NONVOTING AMONG REGISTERED VOTERS IN CALIFORNIA AND OHIO SAMPLE PRECINCTS  
BY REGISTERED PARTY AFFILIATION

Party Registration	(1) Registered Voters		(2) % Who Failed To Vote		(3) % "Nonvoters" Moved Or Died		(4) <sup>a/</sup> % Corrected Proportion Nonvoters			
	Calif.	Ohio	Calif.	Ohio	Calif.	Ohio	Calif.	Ohio		
Republicans  Democrats  Other <sup>b/</sup>	N	%	N	%						
	3977	48	749	25	13	12	65	59	5	5
	3967	48	763	26	15	11	77	54	4	6
	323	04	1443	49	20	20	74	61	7	9
All Registrants	8267	100	2955	100	14	16	71	59	4	7

<sup>a/</sup> Correction procedure: number of apparent nonvoters (Column 2) minus those who had moved or died (Column 3) divided by number of voters on registration lists (Column 1) minus "nonvoters" who had moved or died.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes registered voters who were registered neither as Democrats nor Republicans.



TABLE 6

EXPLANATION OF NONVOTING, CALIFORNIA AND OHIO

"Reason" For Not Voting	Nonvoters			
	California (Original Sample Only)		Ohio	
	N	%	N	%
Moved	156	67 <sup>a/</sup>	62	52
Deceased	11	5 <sup>a/</sup>	8	7
"Physical" inability	26	11	20	17
"Psychological" abstention	4	2	7	6
Not at home	22	9	9	8
Claimed to have voted	3	1	3	3
Refused to be interviewed	12	5	10	8
	<u>234</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>101<sup>b/</sup></u>

<sup>a/</sup> Combined Moved and Deceased: 167, or 71%.

<sup>b/</sup> Percents add to 101 due to rounding.



TABLE 7

LATE VOTERS WHO CONSIDERED NOT VOTING BEFORE OR ON ELECTION DAY<sup>a/</sup>

	LATE VOTERS WHO ...		
	Before Election Day Seriously Considered:	On Election Day Still Seriously Considered:	On Election Day Carried Out Intent: <sup>b/</sup>
	N      %	N	N
Not voting at all	23      7	6	-
Not voting for President	51      14	13	2
Not voting for Senator	30      9	9	6
Some form of abstention	68      19	23	8
Never considered nonvoting	<u>284</u> <u>81</u> 352      100	-	-

<sup>a/</sup> Based on three separate questions asked of all voters as to whether they ever seriously considered (a) not voting at all (b) voting, but not voting for President and (c) voting, but not voting for Senator. Sixty-eight persons gave a total of 104 affirmative responses. Persons who answered "Yes" to any item were then asked whether they "still considered this on Election Day".

<sup>b/</sup> These questions were not asked of nonvoters and therefore the possible effect of the network returns on total abstentions that occurred cannot be inferred from this table but only from other data.



TABLE 8

ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS OF LATE VOTERS WHO  
HAD DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT<sup>a/</sup>

Election Day Perception	Voters With Pre-Election Doubts About Whether To Vote For President (N = 51)		Percent Of All Voters  (N = 352)
	N	%	
Johnson "had won" ("would win")	22 <sup>b/</sup>	43	33
Johnson probably the winner	2	4	3
Johnson "ahead" but no conclusion	4	8	14
Goldwater had a chance to win	0	0	1
Election Day perception but no conclusion as to probable victor	8	16	11
Total with Election Day perceptions	36	71	62 <sup>c/</sup>

<sup>a/</sup> Seventeen persons had only considered not voting for Senator by itself. None of these persons had any idea about how the race for Senator was going at the time they voted.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes one person who carried out his intention to vote only for Senator but not for President. One other person who voted for Senator but not President had no idea of how the election was going before voting.

<sup>c/</sup> This differs (by one percent) from the figure derived from Table 2 since this percent is based on the total number of voters while Table 2 reports on the total sample and thus includes nonvoters.





TABLE 9  
RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS RELATED TO BANDWAGON EFFECTS

Statements Related To Bandwagon Effects	CALIFORNIA (N=364)						OHIO (N=116)					
	Agree	Can't Say	Disagree	N. A.	Agree	Can't Say	Disagree	N. A.				
	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %				
(A) "If I have no clear preference, I like to be for the man who is running ahead."	13 4	7 2	342 94	2 1	9 8	3 3	104 90	- -				
(B) "If you vote for a loser you are wasting your vote."	7 2	2 1	353 97	2 1	2 2	1 1	113 97	- -				
(C) "Public opinion polls hurt the chances of the candidate they say is behind."	140 38	31 9	186 51	5 1	27 23	15 13	73 63	1 1				

a/ Respondents who "can't say" should be considered to be more similar to those who agree than to those who disagree.



TABLE 10

PRE-VOTING ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS BY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

Presidential Vote	Total (N=100%) <sup>a/</sup>	Perception On Election Day Before Voting <sup>b/</sup>			
		Certain Of Outcome		No Information	
		N	%	N	%
Goldwater	123	43	35	41	33
Johnson	211	69	33	82	39
Refused to reveal vote	16	4	25	7	44
Did <u>not</u> vote or did <u>not</u> vote for President	14	7	50	6	43
	<u>364</u>				

<sup>a/</sup> For nonvoters, the reference is to perceptions before polls closed.

<sup>b/</sup> Those who had some idea of how the Presidential race was going but who were not "certain of the outcome" are omitted.



TABLE 11

PRE-VOTING ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE  
PRESIDENTIAL RACE BY PRE-ELECTION EXPECTATIONS

Pre-Election Expectation Of The Outcome Of The Presidential Race	Total (N=100%) <sup>a/</sup>	Perception On Election Day Before Voting <sup>b/</sup>			
		Certain Of Outcome		No Information	
		N	%	N	%
Not close at all	197	80	41	65	33
Fairly close	115	32	28	45	39
Extremely close	32	7	22	16	50
Don't know, no answer	<u>20</u>	4	20	10	50
	364				

<sup>a/</sup> For nonvoters, the reference is to perceptions before polls closed.

<sup>b/</sup> Those who had some idea of how the Presidential race was going but who were not "certain of the outcome" are omitted.



TABLE 12

PRE-VOTING ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS BY SALIENCE  
OF PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Salience Of Presidential Race	Total (N=100%) <sup>a/</sup>	Perception On Election Day Before Voting <sup>b/</sup>			
		Certain Of Outcome		No Information	
		N	%	N	%
A. Who wins makes . . .					
A great deal of difference	274	100	36	97	35
Little difference	<u>73</u>	19	26	32	44
	347				
B. More important than most	218	79	36	77	35
Same as or less important than most	<u>129</u>	39	30	49	38
	347				

<sup>a/</sup> Seventeen respondents for each question (although not the same persons) felt they could not answer and are omitted from the tabulation.

<sup>b/</sup> Those who had some idea of how the Presidential race was going but who were not "certain of outcome" are omitted. For nonvoters, the reference is to all perceptions before polls closed.





TABLE 13

EAGERNESS TO VOTE BY ALL ELECTION DAY PERCEPTIONS,  
BELIEF IN JOHNSON VICTORY, AND BY TIME OF VOTING

	Total (N=100%)	"More Eager" To Vote		"Less Eager" To Vote		Total: More Eager-Less Eager	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
All Election Day perceptions	221	37	17	21	10	58	26
Johnson "would win" ("had won")	117	27	23	17	15	44	38
Did not vote by . . .		N	%	N	%	N	%
4:00 p.m. (but voted by 5:30 p.m.)	144	9	6	6	4	15	10
5:30 p.m. (but voted by 6:30 p.m.)	126	16	13	6	5	22	18
6:30 p.m. (but voted by 8:00 p.m.)	80	12	15	9	11	21	26
	350 <sup>a/</sup>	37	11	21	6	58	17

<sup>a/</sup> Two voters did not cast a vote for President.



TABLE 14

PRESIDENTIAL RACE  
EAGERNESS TO VOTE BY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE  
AND PERCEPTION OF OUTCOME AS CERTAIN

Presidential Vote	"More Eager" To Vote		Total
	Outcome Certain	Other	
Goldwater	12	4	16
Johnson	14	6	20
Refused to reveal vote	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	27	10	37

  

	"Less Eager" To Vote		Total
	Outcome Certain	Other	
Goldwater	6	2	8
Johnson	10	2	12
Refused to reveal vote	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	17	4	21

  

	Total: "More Eager-Less Eager"		Total
	Outcome Certain	Other	
Goldwater	18	6	24
Johnson	24	8	32
Refused to reveal vote	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
	44	14	58



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Withdrawn from UF. Surveyed to Internet Archive

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of stylized, cursive letters.

...

$$Re^{\pm} = 1 - d$$

Date Due

DUE	RETURNED	DUE	RETURNED
438			